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This paper takes as its point of departure Husserl’s claim that the only world we 
can speak of is the one given in consciousness or that presents itself to intuition. 
Husserl’s insistence on the world’s status as a phenomenon whose being can 
never be verified, as such a verification would require an act of mind, has led to 
the accusation that phenomenology is nothing but a form of idealism that 
discounts the validity of everything apart from consciousness. This paper turns 
this accusation on its head. To the extent that phenomenology addresses the 
role that consciousness plays in constituting the world, it draws attention to 
consciousness’ worldly aspects as not only the ground for all intuition but intuition 
itself in its sensuality. Consciousness is identical with what it observes, be it a 
bird in flight, the unfolding petals of a rose bud, or a discarded doll gathering dust 
in an attic. Rilke’s poetry more than any other exposes the sensuality of thought 
by exploring the inner contours of feeling or what he calls elsewhere the 
Weltinnenraum. This paper shows the intersection of poetry and phenomenology 
through a close reading of “Die Rosenschale,” which forms the conclusion of the 
first volume of the collection Neue Gedichte. 
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Husserl believed phenomenology could provide a secure foundation for the 
world, so that it could be an object of study in turn. This may seem like an odd 
statement to make regarding a philosopher who declared that we must set aside 
the assumption that the world exists until we have established the meaning of 
existence itself. In a less than felicitous turn of phrase he claimed that the 
analysis of the world begins with its destruction, in German: Vernichtung.1 At the 
same time he insisted that the destruction of the world represents not a loss but a 
gain. For instance, in the first volume of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913) he states, “Strictly 
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speaking, we have not lost anything, but rather have gained the whole of 
absolute being, which, rightly understood, contains within itself, ‘constitutes’ 
within itself, all worldly transcendencies” (Ideen I, §50, 113). In setting aside the 
world apart from us, we open philosophy to a realm of being based in the subject: 
the world of consciousness. 
 This is the one indisputable world for Husserl, the “whole of absolute 
being.” It contains within itself “all worldly transcendencies,” which in his 
terminology means things as they are given in or present themselves to 
consciousness without the mediation of concepts or ideas. Carsten Strauthausen 
explains this dynamic as follows, “Husserl’s aspiration to focus on the things 
themselves (Zu den Sachen selbst) insists on there being no higher form of truth 
than the intuitive evidence of how things present themselves in actual 
experience.”2 Husserl’s innovation, if it can be called that, was to turn philosophy 
back toward things, albeit with the caveat that we can speak of things only to the 
extent that we intuit them or they appear to us, which is to say as phenomena 
that are inextricably bound up with our mental life.  
 Much like Descartes, Husserl argued that everything we perceive (every 
cogitatum) refers back to us as the perceiving subject (or cogito) that makes this 
phenomenon possible. We, in other words, are the ground for all worldly objects 
since what defines them as objects in the first place is that they are given in 
consciousness. This may seem like a circular argument—and a case could be 
made that it is since it amounts to saying that what is given in consciousness 
attests to consciousness—but the point worth noting is that what does not appear 
to us cannot be said to exist. It cannot even be identified as what has yet to be 
thought. The world we inhabit is in Husserl’s vocabulary an egological sphere 
because of its foundation in the ego. Rilke called it the Weltinnenraum. 
 In her landmark essay “Die phänomenologische Struktur der Dichtung 
Rilkes,” Käte Hamburger argued that Rilke, like Husserl, explores the role 
consciousness plays in the construction of the external world.3 For both poet and 
philosopher, consciousness operates intentionally, which means that it posits a 
world beyond it to organize the impressions that run through it in a continual 
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stream. Intentionality is thus often summarized in the phrase, “Consciousness is 
always the consciousness of something.” The mind’s orientation toward objects 
enables it to project a unity out of the various and sundry impressions that run 
through it—impressions that are immanent to consciousness. These impressions 
are reclassified, in turn, as manifestations of a single object that can never be 
grasped fully, as it transcends consciousness. For example, a table can be 
viewed from above, below, or at an angle but never from all sides at once; it is 
present to us in its various aspects or Abschattungen (adumbrations), but never 
in its entirety. Rilke’s poetry and especially his thing-poems draw attention to the 
“stream” of experiences that flood consciousness and the synthetic labor that 
transforms them into a unity. But they also do more than that. They call into 
question the distinction between inside and outside or self and world by revealing 
the subjective basis of all objective phenomena and even objectivity itself. In this 
manner they locate even in the most mundane matters and everyday things a 
transcendent dimension or what Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei calls “the 
ecstatic quotidian.”4 
 It is this aspect of Rilke’s poetry that leads Hamburger to claim that the 
thinker and the poet address the same problem, albeit it in different ways. (Her 
line that Rilke writes “lyric poetry in lieu of epistemology” could be considered the 
motto of the essay.5) But such an interpretation, for all its formidable intelligence, 
ignores what Rilke’s poetry has to say not only about the constitution of the world 
but also about the self. For if the subject constitutes the world, then subjectivity is 
itself worldly. It is identical with what it observes, be it a bird in flight, the 
unfolding petals of a rose bud, or a discarded doll gathering dust in an attic. As 
Lawrence Ryan observes, “[The subject] has above all to listen [“lauschen”] to 
the secret life that is in him, but not entirely of him. He speaks not of things, but 
with things as they impinge on the self, and precisely in so doing he speaks of 
himself, is subjective.”6 Inside and outside, self and other meet in the space of 
consciousness, which for both Rilke and Husserl is the world we inhabit: 
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Durch alle Wesen reicht der eine Raum: 
Weltinnenraum. Die Vögel fliegen still 
durch uns hindurch. O, der ich wachsen will, 
ich seh hinaus, und in mir wächst der Baum. 
 
Ich sorge mich, und in mir steht das Haus. 
Ich hüte mich, und in mir ist die Hut. 
Geliebter, der ich wurde: an mir ruht 
der schönen Schöpfung Bild und weint sich aus.7 
 
[One space spreads through all creatures equally— 
inner-world-space. Birds quietly flying go 
flying through us. Oh, I that want to grow, 
the tree I look outside at grows in me! 
 
It stands in me, that house I look for still, 
in me that shelter I have not possessed. 
I, the now well-beloved: on my breast 
this fair world’s image clings and weeps her fill.8]  
 
 
Natural and Unnatural Worlds 
 A brief sketch of the main ideas of phenomenology will provide the 
background for the discussion of Rilke’s poetry in the second half of this essay. 
Throughout his career Husserl tried to write what he thought would serve as a 
general introduction to phenomenology from the 1907 lecture course The Idea of 
Phenomenology to the 1929 lectures Cartesian Meditations, subtitled “An 
Introduction to Phenomenology,” and finally the unfinished 1936 volume The 
Crisis of European Sciences, also subtitled “An Introduction to Phenomenological 
Philosophy.” The most successful introduction nonetheless remains the first 
volume of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology (1913), itself subtitled a 
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“General Introduction,” where he formulated the method of “transcendental 
phenomenology” that was to shape his work until his death in 1938. As the 
description of this method as “transcendental” already implies, phenomenology 
explores the conditions under which knowledge is possible at all. Like Kant, 
Husserl was convinced that philosophy had erred in looking toward the object 
instead of the subject for the basis of experience. In contrast to Kant, however, 
he also believed that knowledge was not the representation of a thing apart from 
us, a so-called Ding an sich, but a synthesis that produces external objects or 
what he called “worldly transcendencies.” The task of phenomenology is to show 
how this process works and the first step in doing so is to cast a spotlight on the 
assumption that the world exists characteristic of the “natural attitude.” 
 The natural attitude can be summed up in the proposition that the world is 
always there for us, and since it is there we can experience it in any number of 
ways—for instance as something we perceive, remember, imagine, or 
contemplate to name but a few examples. More often than not, however, we 
experience the world as something we rely on, as when we take a step without 
looking at the ground in front of us to make sure that it is there. No modern 
author has explored more forcefully how much we rely on the natural world than 
Franz Kafka, whose works invariably begin with the protagonist’s discovery that 
the world he previously assumed does not in fact exist. Think, for example, of 
Gregor Samsa who wakes up one morning to find out that his body has been 
transformed overnight into a many-legged insect body with a hard, round shell for 
a back; or Josef K. who upon awakening learns that his private bedroom is in fact 
an auxiliary courtroom belonging to the state. To indicate how far the natural 
world extends, Husserl emphasizes that everything we perceive is accompanied 
by an “obscurely apprehended horizon of indeterminate actualities” [einem 
dunkel bewußten Horizont unbestimmter Wirklichkeiten] (Ideen I, §27, 52/57), by 
which he means a background of objects that have yet to be defined, as they 
have yet to rise to prominence. (I only notice the ground, for instance, when I 
trip.) This is the world posited in the natural attitude. It is a shared or common 
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space, albeit one that could easily exist without us since it does not depend on us 
for its being. In Ideas, Husserl questions the self-evidence of just this world. 
 Indeed, one of the achievements of phenomenology was to highlight the 
role consciousness plays in establishing the so-called objective world. It does so 
not by subjecting the external world to extra scrutiny but by setting it aside in a 
move known as the epoché, which is the Greek word for suspending or 
bracketing. Through this seemingly dramatic maneuver, which Husserl also 
called the Weltvernichtung, phenomenology is able to determine the acts of 
consciousness that produce objects and the phenomena that refer back to them. 
A key tenet of phenomenology is that there is a correlation between the modes in 
which things are given (Gegebenheitsweisen, noema) and the mental acts by 
which we apprehend them (Erlebnisarten, noeisis). For example, every thing or 
person remembered corresponds to an act of memory, as every perceived object 
corresponds to an act of perception. In broad terms, every thought (or cogitatum) 
corresponds to an act of thinking (or cogitatio), since without the mental act there 
would  be no phenomenon at all. Husserl accordingly asserts, “Whatever things 
are…they are as things of experience [Dinge der Erfahrung]. It is experience 
alone that prescribes their sense” (Ideen I, §47, 106/100, translation modifed). In 
other words, whatever we are conscious of is determined by our mode of our 
apprehension. Examining these modes, submitting them to an eidetic analysis is 
the principal task of phenomenology. 
 One might ask how the sketched relationship between phenomena and 
consciousness can be made to cohere with Husserl’s famous dictum, “To the 
things themselves,” which is then reformulated in the Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology as the “principle of all principles.” The principle asserts “that 
every originary intuition is a legitimate source of knowledge, that everything that 
is originarily (so to speak in its bodily actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be 
accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in 
which it is presented” [daß jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle 
der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der ‘Intuition’ originär, (sozusagen 
in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es 
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sich gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich gibt] (Ideen I, §24, 
44/60). Phenomenology begins, as I suggested in the introduction, with what is 
evident to us without the mediation of concepts, which turn all specific and 
idiosyncratic phenomena into generic types. The phenomena it starts with are in 
this sense “originary”: One can never get behind them to arrive at their source, 
since they are inaccessible to us except as intuited objects or objects given in 
consciousness. Everything we experience is, consequently, limited to or bound 
by consciousness; all phenomena inhere in the subjectivity that constitutes them 
as intentional objects, which are correlates of consciousness. To turn “to the 
things themselves” thus means to turn toward things as we apprehend them in 
their multiple adumbrations. In either case, consciousness is the parameter in 
which things become evident to us. But the reverse of this statement is true as 
well: Things are the parameter in which consciousness becomes evident to us as 
the basis for the known world. 
 While Husserl never says explicitly that consciousness becomes visible in 
its intentional objects, he does indicate that it is concretized in its Erlebnisse or 
mental acts, which distinguish it not only from other egos but also from 
transcendental subjectivity itself. Like the German Idealists before him, he draws 
a distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness, as the 
following quote demonstrates: “In a certain way…we can also say that all real 
unities are ‘unities of sense.’ Unities of sense presuppose…a sense-bestowing 
consciousness which, for its part, exists absolutely and not by virtue of another 
sense-bestowal” (Ideen I, §55, 128-29). This absolute consciousness, which 
creates all unities of sense (i.e., objects) but is not itself created by another 
subjectivity, is Husserl’s primary interest as a philosopher who seeks to establish 
a system of knowledge that is not derived from anything else.  Like Descartes 
before him, he finds the foundation for this system in the ego, which is evident to 
itself through the act of thinking and nothing else. In the Cartesian Meditations, a 
series of lectures he delivered in Paris in 1929 and later revised for publication, 
he retraces Descartes’ steps, first considering the evidence produced by the 
senses as a measure of truth on which to base all subsequent judgments. And 
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like his predecessor, he immediately points out that the evidence of the senses is 
unreliable, as it depends on the appearance of something that could easily 
disappear, thereby revealing a rift between a thing’s appearance and its essence. 
He thus proposes another form of evidence that attests to something whose 
inexistence or absence is inconceivable—“unausdenkbar” to use his phrase. This 
evidence, which he describes as apodictic, is the mind at work or consciousness 
engaged in thinking, which is subjectivity’s unique domain. 
 It is inconceivable that there would be no mind or that the mind would not 
exist, since such a judgment would require an act of mind, which would itself 
contradict the very proposition it sets out to demonstrate. The mind at work as 
such fulfills the criteria for apodictic evidence. What is more interesting, however, 
is how the ego manifests itself since, by Husserl’s own admission, it is 
continuously engaged in thinking understood in the broadest sense as the full 
range of mental activities from verifying and counting to hallucinating and 
daydreaming. Again like Descartes Husserl finds indubitable proof of the ego in a 
negative act. Just as Descartes discovers the cogito in doubting everything 
around him, so too Husserl locates the transcendental ego in setting aside the 
assumption that the external world exists. In both cases, consciousness emerges 
as the agent of these otherwise privative acts, i.e., a force that cannot be 
doubted or bracketed since nothing would be left to set aside or doubt. Husserl 
consequently claims that for Descartes the statement “I doubt” precedes “I am” 
and would seem to echo this claim when he refers to the ego as the agent that 
withholds belief in the objectivity of the world (“jene Enthaltung übendes Ich”9). 
 Is this, however, the exclusive manner in which the ego becomes evident 
to itself? Does the mind emerge for Husserl only in this pared down form, albeit 
with the capacity to acquire predicates thanks to its newfound certainty, which 
makes it the bedrock for all knowledge? While Husserl would seem to point in 
this direction, he also leaves room for another interpretation, one which highlights 
the difference between doubting and bracketing or doubting and withholding 
belief in the external world.  
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 It is useful to recall that what enables Descartes to affirm the existence of 
the ego by doubting everything around him is that doubt clears the slate, leaving 
nothing behind but the I that doubts, which is also the I that thinks—in short, the 
cogito. This reversal whereby the act of doubting becomes the grounds for 
certainty occurs in the Second Meditation, when Descartes realizes that even if 
an Evil Genius deceives him about everything, he must still exist since being 
deceived is still an experience available only to thinking subjects: “Beyond doubt 
then, I also exist, if [an Evil Genius] is deceiving me, and he can deceive me all 
he likes, but he will never bring it about that I should be nothing as long as I think 
I am something.”10 Bracketing, by contrast, does not negate the world. It directs 
our thoughts inwards to the world constituted in consciousness or what Rilke 
would call the Weltinnenraum. What remains once the external world has been 
set aside is the entire sphere of our mental life, including the unities created out 
of diverse impressions, i.e., intentional objects. This is why Husserl insists that 
the epoché brings about not a loss but a gain. It secures a world that derives its 
entire sense and claim to being from our cogitationes. One is tempted to say, 
drawing on the language of the “principle of all principles,” that the epoché 
preserves the world “so to speak in its bodily actuality [sozusagen in [ihrer] 
leibhaften Wirklichkeit]” (Ideen I, §24, 44/51), provided that one understands that 
“bodily actuality” is not the predicate of an object but of consciousness itself, 
which is identical with what it experiences since what it experiences is ultimately 
its own mental operations. The qualifier “so to speak” that Husserl throws into 
this statement may diminish the boldness of his claim regarding consciousness, 
but it cannot disguise the insight that in phenomenology thought acquires an 
immediacy usually reserved for bodies. Sensuality becomes in this school of 
thought an aspect of our mental life. 
Kunstdinge 
Rilke evokes the sensuality of thought in the poem “Die Rosenschale” (Bowl of 
Roses) written in 1907, six years before the publication of Ideas and more than 
two decades before Husserl’s Paris lectures. I mention these dates not because 
they are significant but to underscore that the poem has no direct relation to 
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phenomenology. Rilke was not influenced by Husserl’s writing. And yet the poet 
seems to anticipate the philosopher’s analysis of what it means to withhold belief 
in the objective world in an uncanny way. Of note is that in the Cartesian 
Meditation, Husserl does not speak so much of “bracketing” and “setting aside” 
as “withholding” or “abstaining” (Sich-Enthalten).  Abstention, he tells us, does 
not strip us of everything but instead furnishes us with a pure “I” in an argument 
that all but reiterates Descartes’ on doubt: “If I abstained…from every belief 
involved in or founded on sensuous experience, so that the being of the 
experienced world remains unaccepted by me, still this abstaining is what it is; 
and it exists, together with the whole stream of my experiencing life.”11 (The full 
quote in German reads, “Enthalte ich mich…jedes sinnlichen und in Sinnlichkeit 
fundierten Erfahrungsglaubens, sodaß für mich das Sein der Erfahrungswelt 
außer Geltung bleibt, so ist doch dieses Mich-Enthalten, was es ist, und es ist 
mitsamt dem ganzen Strom des erfahrenden Lebens.”12) If abstaining from 
believing in the empirical world amounts to something—if it “it is what it is,” as 
Husserl puts it awkwardly here—it is because it brings to the foreground the “I,” 
which abstains from belief in everything save what it contains within itself, which 
is the “entire stream of [its] experiencing life.” (In German one might pun, “Es 
enthält sich alles, außer was es in sich enthält.”) For Husserl, even as the ego 
sets aside the world of experience, it maintains the full array of its experiences 
apart from any empirical referent. One could say in keeping with the vocabulary 
of “Bowl of Roses” that the ego “contains itself.” 
 Rilke placed “Bowl of Roses” at the conclusion of the first volume of New 
Poems published in 1907. The collection was inspired by his work with Auguste 
Rodin, whom he credited with teaching him how to see the world in a new 
manner. In the second half of the poem, the poet catalogues the various roses in 
a bowl and their distinct character or personalities. There is the pale cotton rose 
(“die batistene”) that calls to mind the undergarments made from the same fabric; 
and there is an “opal porcelain” rose that is so named because it is as fragile as a 
teacup. And then there is a rose that has no name and no color: 
und jene da, die nichts enthält als sich. 




Und sind nicht alle so, nur sich enthaltend, 
wenn Sich-enthalten heißt: die Welt da draußen 
und Wind und Regen und Geduld des Frühlings 
und Schuld und Unruh und vermummtes Schicksal 
und Dunkelheit der abendlichen Erde 
bis auf der Wolken Wandel, Flucht und Anflug, 
bis auf den vagen Einfluß ferner Sterne 
in eine Hand voll Innres zu verwandeln. 
 
Nun liegt es sorglos in den offnen Rosen. (KA I: 510) 
 
[and that one, containing nothing but itself. 
 
And aren’t they all that way: simply self-containing 
if self-containing means: to transform the world outside 
and wind and rain and the patience of spring 
and guilt and restlessness and muffled fate 
and the darkness of the evening earth 
out to the roaming and flying and fleeing of the clouds 
and the vague influence of distant stars 
into a handful of inwardness. 
 
Now it lies carefree in these open roses.13] 
 
What the philosopher can only conceive as an act of abstaining and renouncing 
(Sich-Enthalten) becomes in the poet’s hands a gesture of gathering, containing, 
and embodying. Indeed, he tells us, “Sich-enthalten heißt: die Welt da draußen / 
… / in eine Hand voll Innres zu verwandeln.” Everything we set aside as an 
external reality returns in us as the content of our inner life, the landscape of our 
thoughts. This is how Rilke restores sensuality to what would otherwise be a 
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world stripped of all physical characteristics as a mere phenomenon or object of 
consciousness. The oppositions between self and other, inner and outer, and 
spirit and matter disappear as materiality and corporeality become metaphors of 
consciousness itself, “a handful of inwardness.” Put somewhat crudely, what 
Rilke’s poem shows in this final turn is that the colors and textures associated 
with objects are in fact the colors and textures of consciousness.  
 One might object that this reading reduces the poem to an allegory of 
phenomenology; it interprets the text as an illustration of a method rather than a 
reflection on the moment when rose buds open and reveal what they had held 
concealed in their interior. Käte Hamburger was frequently criticized on this 
score, though it is likely she would have claimed that she was not translating 
Rilke’s poetry into the language of phenomenology. On the contrary his poetry 
gave phenomenology what it did not otherwise have: the language of things. 
Things speak in his work, and at first it would seem that they do so because they 
are themselves endowed with consciousness. Such, however, is the lure of 
Rilke’s thing-poems.14 The life of things derives not from their independence, but 
from the fact that they are experienced or intuited, erlebt, and as erlebte 
Gegenstände they have the status of phenomena given in consciousness. We 
might call them Kunstdinge.   
 Hamburger herself demonstrates this in her reading of “The Swan,” which 
likewise appeared in New Poems.  She notes that the poem begins with an 
analogy that would be trite, were it not for the unexpected reversal of terms in the 
comparison: 
Diese Mühsal, durch noch Ungetanes 
schwer und wie gebunden hinzugehen 
gleicht dem ungeschaffnen Gang des Schwans. (KA I: 473) 
 
[This laboring through what is still undone,  
as though, legs bound, we hobbled along the way,  
is like the awkward walking of the swan.15] 
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Hamburger comments that while one might assume that the lumbering gait of the 
swan is a metaphor for our struggles in life, the reverse is in fact the case.16 Our 
struggles are a metaphor for the awkward movement of the swan on terra firma, 
as indicated by the dative case. As she is quick to caution, however, this reversal 
does not mean that we in our toils illustrate the labor of the swan; our life is not a 
metaphor for this creature, known to paddle furiously underwater while gliding 
gracefully on the surface. Such a reading in Hamburger’s opinion mistakes the 
point of the poem, which is to show that the swan is a phenomenon, whose 
meaning derives from our reflection on it. We endow the swan with meaning and 
in so doing make it speak by lifting it from its empirical state and turning it into an 
intentional object. We, in other words, turn this visible creature into an invisible 
essence so that it stands henceforth in consciousness as a product of 
consciousness, namely as a Kunstding or even a Dinggedicht.  The poem “The 
Swan” shows with enormous precision that bracketing is the condition for the 
making of art and, more generally, the making of meaning. 
 A similar structure is at play in “The Bowl of Roses” which as the final work 
in the first volume of New Poems lends itself to being read as an allegory for the 
entire collection. Indeed the two nouns that make up the title are significant in this 
regard. The roses in this one poem are figures for all the poems in the collection, 
as the bowl is a figure for the collection itself, which gathers various phenomena 
and places them in a single vessel where they are one and yet diverse. But “The 
Bowl of Roses” is also an allegory for art, which takes what is exterior and turns it 
into something interior, as the final two stanzas of the poem demonstrate. 
According to these stanzas, all the elements that the plant is exposed to—wind, 
rain, darkness—are incorporated into the blossom, which stands open in the final 
line like a gift to the reader or a hand offered in friendship: “Nun liegt es sorglos 
in den offenen Rosen.” With this image, the poem is able to overcome the 
antagonism portrayed in the first stanza, where two boys wrestle with each other 
and form a tight ball reminiscent of a clenched fist: 
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Zornige sahst du flackern, sahst zwei Knaben  
zu einem Etwas sich zusammenballen,  
das Haß war und sich auf der Erde wälzte  
wie ein von Bienen überfallnes Tier;  
Schauspieler, aufgetürmte Übertreiber,  
rasende Pferde, die zusammenbrachen,  
den Blick wegwerfend, bläkend das Gebiß  
als schälte sich der Schädel aus dem Maule. 
 
[You’ve seen caged anger flare, seen two boys   
roll themselves up into a knot   
of pure hatred, writhing on the ground   
like an animal attacked by bees;   
you’ve seen actors, giant exaggerators,   
careening horses crashing down,  
flinging their eyes away, baring their teeth   
as if their skulls were peeling through their mouths.17] 
 
The poem invokes but immediately turns away from this scene of conflict, which 
serves as a foil for the serenity and mutual dependence of the roses evoked 
throughout the poem and especially in the third and fourth stanzas.18 Inside the 
flower bowl, the poem finds a life that is neither hampered from without nor 
constrained from within, as it does not face anything opposed to it, like the two 
boys, or opposite it, as would, say, a botanist. Rilke never tired of noting, and not 
only in the Eighth Duino Elegy, that everything we set opposite us comes to 
function as our opponent, as it represents the limits of our powers and person. 
 The third stanza of the poem reads: 
 
Lautloses Leben, Aufgehn ohne Ende, 
Raum-brauchen ohne Raum von jenem Raum 
zu nehmen, den die Dinge rings verringern, 
Konturen VIII (2015) 
	
54 
fast nicht Umrissen-sein wie Ausgespartes 
und lauter Inneres, viel seltsam Zartes 
und Sich-bescheinendes—bis an den Rand: 
ist irgend ewas uns bekannt wie dies? (KA I: 509) 
 
[Life lived in quietness, endless opening out, 
space being used without space being taken 
from the space that adjacent things diminish, 
outline just hinted at, like ground left blank 
and pure withinness, much so strangely soft 
and self-illuminating—out to the edge: 
do we know anything like this?19] 
 
The repetitions in this stanza have been the source of some consternation, as if 
the poem tries to draw distinctions where none exist, at least none that are 
registered in language. Particular pressure is brought to bear on the word 
“space” (“Raum”) which designates, on the one hand, a force that separates 
bodies and, on the other, one that joins them together. Both facets are evident in 
the lines, “Raum-brauchen ohne Raum von jenem Raum / zu nehmen, den die 
Dinge rings verringern,” in which the internal rhymes seem to speak in ways the 
words themselves cannot. For the kind of space that does not surround things 
and circumscribe them is one in which two things sound at once. This happens in 
the repeated phoneme “au” in “Lautlos,” “Aufgehen,” Raum,” “brauchen,” and 
“Ausgespartes” which is properly speaking a dipthong, and which stands in stark 
contrast to the phoneme “ing” in “Dinge,” “rings” and “verringern.” The former 
sound forms a bridge between elements, whereas the latter sets them apart, and 
in setting them apart also sets them outside this circle in which everything rises 
continually—“Aufgehen ohne Ende”—for there is nothing there to stop this 
movement. 
 The movement takes on specifically sexual connotations in the fourth 
stanza, which is as much about the ways flowers and poems transform an 
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outside into an inside as it is about the ways the two propagate themselves in an 
act that would have to be called autopoetic: 
 
ist irgend etwas uns bekannt wie dies? 
 
Und dann wie dies: daß ein Gefühl entsteht, 
weil Blütenblätter Blütenblätter rühren? 
Und dies: daß eins sich aufschlägt wie ein Lid, 
und drunter liegen lauter Augenlider, 
geschlossene, als ob sie, zehnfach schlafend, 
zu dämpfen hätten eines Innern Sehkraft. 
Und dies vor allem: daß durch diese Blätter 
das Licht hindurch muß. Aus den tausend Himmeln 
filtern sie langsam jenen Tropfen Dunkel, 
in dessen Feuerschein das wirre Bündel 
der Staubgefäße sich erregt und aufbäumt. (KA I: 509) 
 
[do we know anything like this? 
 
And like this: that a feeling arises 
because flower-petals touch flower-petals? 
And this: that one eye opens like an eye, 
and beneath it lie eyelid after eyelid, 
all tightly closed, as if through a tenfold sleep 
they might curb an inner power of sight. 
And this above all: that through these petals 
light must pass. From a thousand skies 
they slowly filter out that drop of darkness 
in whose fiery glow the tangled mass 
of stamens bestirs itself and grows erect.20] 
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Much as in the third stanza, so too here the sound quality of the poem evokes 
what the words can hardly express. The unfolding petals of the rose, each of 
which rests upon the other, is conveyed in the alliteration evident in the line “weil 
Blütenblätter Blütenblätter rühren,” which is all but impossible to read aloud 
without tripping over the repeated labial consonants (i.e., “Blüten” and “Blätter”). 
In this manner the poem is able to generate the sensation of rose petals touching 
each other. But it also does more than that. It mimics the fluttering movement of 
the petals in its alliteration and in so doing forges a link between rose petals and 
eyelids, which is not unusual in Rilke’s poetry, but which here has a particular 
valence, since the two are not only metaphors for each other but for the text 
itself, which cannot open itself completely without dispelling its inner secret, its 
“inner power of sight,” as the poem puts it.21 The poem “The Rose Interior” from 
the New Poems: The Other Part considers just this situation, when flowers begin 
to exfoliate and by extension to lose the interior they had formed by absorbing 
the elements: 
 
… viele ließen 
sich überfüllen und fließen 
über von Innenraum 
in die Tage, die immer 
voller und voller sich schließen. (KA I:569) 
 
[… many let themselves 
fill up with inner space 
until they overflow and stream 
into the days.22] 
 
 In “The Bowl of Roses,” the tenfold power to see is never fully disclosed. It 
remains hidden beneath numerous veils, and this withholding preserves its 
vehicle, which is as much the poem itself, as it is the bowl of roses after which it 
takes its name, and finally the hull or shell—another meaning of the word 
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Schale—of every blossom described in the poem in luxuriant detail. How this 
inner power, drawn from the filtered light outside, is able to engender a work is 
the concern of the remainder of the poem, which explores the poetic process of 
creation through the reproductive dimensions of roses. 
 The botanical process of self-fertilization is almost alchemical for Rilke, 
converting light into matter and making what is bright dark. Indeed the last four 
lines of the fourth stanza could be said to trace the entire reproductive process 
whereby sunlight is turned into liquid that feeds the flower’s receptacle, from 
which the stamens rise loaded with pollen that fertilizes the plant as it passes 
from the stigma to the ovaries: 
 
…Aus den tausend Himmeln 
filtern sie langsam jenen Tropfen Dunkel, 
in dessen Feuerschein das wirre Bündel 
der Staubgefäße sich erregt und aufbäumt. 
 
[…From a thousand skies 
they slowly filter out that drop of darkness 
in whose fiery glow the tangled mass 
of stamens bestirs itself and grows erect.] 
 
The sexual nature of this process is hardly concealed in the poem. The stamens 
are said to be aroused and stand erect in the final line, which reminds us that in 
botany they are the masculine reproductive organs. 
 The absence of any explicit reference to the female reproductive organs of 
a flower may strike one as odd, especially in a poem in which each of the roses 
is personified as a feminine figure. This is due in part to the gender of the noun 
“die Rose,” but it is just as much a choice of the poet who plays up the feminine 
personalities of the various roses in the bowl.  I would suggest that the female 
organs of the flower are included in the title of the poem—in the word “Schale” 
which, as mentioned previously, is also the hull surrounding the fruit and seed of 
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every blossom. The poem hints in this direction when it compares the interior of 
one rose to Botticelli’s Venus standing in a shell—“wie eine Venus aufrecht in der 
Muschel”—though it refrains from using the word “Schale” directly.23 Every rose 
in “The Bowl of Roses” is at once fruit and husk, seed and shell, blossom and 
bowl, that is, a world unto itself, which Husserl would call an egological sphere 
and Rilke the space of art. This world, though set apart (“Ausgespartes”), is not 
closed. It is always visible and available to us, though we never see it, since we 
look for it outside rather than inside. To teach us to see and feel the space we 
already inhabit was Rilke’s and Husserl’s shared goal. Rilke says as much in the 
fourth Duino Elegy, which I quote by way of conclusion: “Wir kennen den Kontur / 
des Fühlens nicht: nur was ihn formt von außen” (KA II: 211) [We do not know 
the contour of feeling, only what shapes it from without]. 
 																																																								
1 The term first appears in Volume I of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, as Husserl discusses the 
difference between the absolute reality posited in the natural attitude and the 
relative one considered in phenomenology. The section in which he discusses 
this difference is entitled, “Das absolute Bewußtsein als Residuum der 
Weltvernichtung” [Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum after the 
Annihilation of the World]. See Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: 
Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, in Husserliana, vol. 3:1, ed. 
Karl Schuhmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), §49, 103-106. The English 
translation is quoted from: E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Book I: General 
Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, tr. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1983), 109-112. Both the German edition and English translation will be 
referred to parenthetically in the text as Ideen I. Section numbers will be followed 
by pages numbers for the English translation; where appropriate, page numbers 
will also be included for the German. 
 
2 Carsten Strathausen, The Look of Things: Poetry and Vision around 1900 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 77. 
 
3 Käte Hamburger, “Die Phänomenologische Struktur der Dichtung Rilkes,” in 
Rilke in neuer Sicht, ed. K. Hamburger (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971), 83-158. 
Hamburger’s monumental achievement in this essay is to demonstrate the 
uncanny parallels between the structure of consciousness in Husserl’s 




phenomenology and Rilke’s poetry. To the degree that she explores the 
premises that underlie Rilke’s work, she engages in a transcendental critique, 
outlining the conditions in which Rilke’s poetry is possible at all. Few critics since 
Hamburger have produced such a systematic analysis.  
 
4 See her discussion of the simultaneous defamiliarization and elevation of 
everyday objects in modern art, as these objects are shown to inhere in 
experience in Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, The Ecstatic Quotidian: 
Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art and Literature (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 13-40.  
 
5 Hamburger, 84. 
 
6 Lawrence Ryan, “Neue Gedichte—New Poems,” in A Companion to the Works 
of Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. Erika A. Metzger and Michael M. Metzger (Rochester: 
Camden House, 2001), 129. 
 
7 Rainer Maria Rilke, “Es winkt zu Fühlung fast aus allen Dingen,” in R. M. Rilke, 
Werke: Kommentierte Ausgabe in vier Bänden, ed. Manfred Engel, Ulrich 
Fülleborn, Horst Nalewski, August Stahl (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1996), II: 113 
(hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as KA). 
 
8 Rainer Maria Rilke, Possibility of Being: A Selection of Poems, tr. James Blaire 
Leishman (New York: New Directions, 1977), 108-109. 
 
9 Both quotes are from Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und 
Pariser Vorträge, in Husserliana, vol. 1, ed. Stephen Strasser (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), §9, 23 and §8, 21 respectively. The reference for the 
English translation is, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, 
tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). 
 
10 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the 
Objections and Replies, trans. with an Introduction and Notes by Michael 
Moriarty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18. 
 
11 Cartesian Meditations, §8, 19. 
 
12 Cartesianische Meditationen, §8, 20. 
 
13 Rainer Maria Rilke, “The Bowl of Roses,” in R. M. Rilke, New Poems: A 
Revised Bilingual Edition, selected and translated by Edward Snow (San 
Francisco: North Point Press, 2001), 165. 
 
14 I discuss the supposed autonomy of things as a projection of interiority in 
Rilke’s Malte Laurids Brigge in R. Tobias, “Rilke’s Landscape of the Heart: On 




The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, in Modernism/modernity 20:4 
(November 2013): 667-684. 
 
15 Rainer Maria Rilke, “The Swan,” in Ahead of All Parting: Selected Poetry and 
Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. and tr. Stephen Mitchell (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1995), 35. 
 
16 Hamburger, “Phänomenologische Struktur der Dichtung Rilkes,” 103-105. 
 
17 Rilke, “The Bowl of Roses,” New Poems, ed. and tr. Edward Snow, 161. 
 
18 Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei argues that while the violence depicted in the 
first stanza may not be mentioned in the remainder of the poem, it informs its 
representations all the same inasmuch as the roses catalogued in the poem are 
cut roses taken from a garden where they were exposed to the elements. See J. 
A. Gosetti-Ferenei, “Immanent Transcendence in Rilke and Stevens,” German 
Quarterly 83:3 (Summer 2010): 282. 
 
19 Rilke, “The Bowl of Roses,” New Poems, ed. and tr. Edward Snow, 161. 
 
20 Rilke, “The Bowl of Roses,” New Poems, ed. and tr. Edward Snow, 161-163. 
 
21 Rilke compares rose petals to eyelids most notably in the epigraph he 
composed for his gravestone: 
Rose, oh reiner Widerspruch, Lust, 
Niemandes Schlaf zu sein unter soviel 
Lidern. (KA II: 394) 
 
22 R. M. Rilke, “The Rose-Interior,” New Poems, ed. and tr. Edward Snow, 277. 
 
23 I am indebted to Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei’s reading of the poem for drawing 
my attention to the reference to Venus. See Gosetti-Ferencei, “Immanent 






Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the 
Objections and Replies. Tr. with Intro. and Notes by Michael Moriarty. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print. 
 
Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna. The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological 
Sightings in Modern Art and Literature. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2007. Print. 





——— “Immanent Transcendence in Rilke and Stevens.” In: German Quarterly 
83:3 (Summer 2010): 275-296. Print. 
 
Hamburger, Käte. “Die Phänomenologische Struktur der Dichtung Rilkes.” In 
Rilke in neuer Sicht. Ed. K. Hamburger (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971. 83-
158. Print. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. In: 
Husserliana. Vol. I. Ed. Stephen Strasser. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1963. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Tr. Dorion 
Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Print. 
 
——— Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie: Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine 
Phänomenologie. In: Husserliana. Vol. III.1. Ed. Karl Schuhmann. The 
Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Book I: General Introduction to a 
Pure Phenomenology. Tr. F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983. 
Print. 
 
Rilke, Rainer Maria. Werke: Kommentierte Ausgabe in vier Bänden. 4 vols. Ed. 
Manfred Engel, Ulrich Fülleborn, Horst Nalewski, and August Stahl. 
Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1996. Print. 
 
——— Ahead of All Parting: Selected Poetry and Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke. 
Ed. and tr. Stephen Mitchell. New York: The Modern Library, 1995. Print. 
 
——— New Poems: A Revised Bilingual Edition. Selected and translated by 
Edward Snow. San Francisco: North Point Press, 2001. Print. 
 
——— Possibility of Being: A Selection of Poems. Tr. James Blaire Leishman. 
New York: New Directions, 1977. Print. 
 
Ryan, Lawrence. “Neue Gedichte—New Poems.” In: A Companion to the Works 
of Rainer Maria Rilke. Ed. Erika A. Metzger and Michael M. Metzger. 
Rochester: Camden House, 2001. 128-153. Print. 
 
Strathausen, Carsten. The Look of Things: Poetry and Vision around 1900. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Print. 
 
Tobias, Rochelle. “Rilke’s Landscape of the Heart: On The Notebooks of Malte 
Laurids Brigge. In Modernism/modernity 20:4 (November 2013): 667-684. 
 
